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INTRODUCTION
CONSIDERING ITS SUBSTANTIAL economic im-portance1 the European Commission dem-
onstrated in the early 1990s a certain interest2
in the “gaming sector.” The Member States,
however, held the firm opinion, based upon the
principle of subsidiarity, that the regulation of
casino games, lotteries and other types of
games was an exclusive Member State matter.
Having considered the remarks brought for-
ward by the Member States, the Commission un-
derlined in 1992 that, even if a legislative initia-
tive was not required, this could not be excluded.
It stated that “as the Community becomes ever
more closely integrated, and technological de-
velopments open up markets worldwide, it can
not be precluded that the Commission will have
to reconsider its position in view of new and as
yet unforeseeable trends.”3
One of those “unforeseeable trends” could
well be the dawning of the information society,
most manifestly demonstrated by the growth
of the Internet, a society, as we all know, with-
out geographical frontiers.
In this article, our objective is to analyze to
what extent gaming operators can engage in
cross-border activities. While European com-
petition law4 can be of importance, our focus
will be on the free provision of services and
goods throughout the European Union, as clar-
ified by the relevant jurisprudence of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice.
Once the limits to this freedom have been an-
alyzed, the impact of the rise of the informa-
tion society, and the underlying opportunities,
will be analyzed.
The freedom to provide services
To create an integrated single European mar-
ket five basic principles were inscribed in the
European Community Treaty (EC Treaty).5 Be-
sides the right of establishment,6 the free move-
Thibault Verbiest is an attorney at the Bars of Brussels
and Paris. He is a senior partner with the ULYS law firm,
http://www.ulys.net. He may be reached at thibault.
verbiest@ulys.net
Ewout Keuleers is an attorney at the Bar of Brussels and
a researcher at the CRID, http://www.crid.be. He is an
associate with the ULYS law firm. He may be reached at
ewout.keuleers@ulys.net
1 See EU Institutions press releases, IP (91)904, October 11,
1991.
2 COOPERS & LYBRAND EUROPE, GAMBLING IN THE SINGLE
MARKET—A STUDY OF THE CURRENT LEGAL AND MARKET
SITUATION (1991).
3 EU Institutions press releases, IP (92)1120, December 23,
1992.
4 See, e.g., Article 86 of the European Community Treaty.
In this regard reference can be made to the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Justice, Case C-83/98 P, French
Republic v. Ladbroke Racing Ltd and the Commission,
2000 OJ C 223; Joined Cases C-359/95/P and C-379/95,
Commission and French Republic v Ladbroke Racing Ltd,
1997 ECR I-6265; and the European Court of First In-
stance, T-67/94, Ladbroke Racing Ltd v Commission,
1998 ECR II-1.
5 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Rome,
March 25, 1957 [hereinafter the EC Treaty].
6 Article 43 EC Treaty (ex article 52):
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, re-
striction on the freedom of establishment of nationals of
a Member State in the territory of another Member State
shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to
restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or sub-
sidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in
the territory of any other Member State.
ment of persons7 and capital,8 the free move-
ment of goods,9 and the free movement of ser-
vices were inscribed in Article 49 of the EC
Treaty.
Article 49 of the EC Treaty states that:
Within the framework of the provisions
set out below, restrictions on freedom to
provide services within the Community
shall be prohibited in respect of nationals
of Member States who are established in
a State of the Community other than that
of the person for whom the services are
intended.10
With some exceptions, which will be com-
mented on later, this article basically guaran-
tees the cross-border provision of services
throughout the European Union. By virtue of
this principle of freedom, a UK bookmaker
should be allowed to deploy his activities on,
for example, the Italian gaming market.
At the time the European Commission un-
folded its intention to adopt a European gam-
ing regulation, none of the Member States re-
garded gaming activities as regular economic
activities and therefore the principles laid
down in the EC Treaty were considered non-
applicable.11 In the meantime, however, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice has formally recog-
nized that there is no reason for not considering
those activities as economic activities.12
The freedom to provide services or goods
throughout the European Union is one of the
main drives behind the European integration.
However, this freedom is not an absolute one.
In order to know to what extent Member States
may enact restrictive measures, one should not
only consider the limits set out in the EC Treaty,
but also the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice.13
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
In the previous decade, the EC Court ruled
three times upon the compatibility between the
European Law and restrictive regulation of the
Member States in the field of gaming activi-
ties.14
Although the facts differ from case to case,
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7 Article 39 EC Treaty (ex article 48):
Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured
within the Community.
Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of
any discrimination based on nationality between workers
of the Member States as regards employment, remunera-
tion and other conditions of work and employment.
8 Article 56 EC Treaty (ex article 73b):
Within the framework of the provisions set out in this
Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital be-
tween Member States and between Member States and
third countries shall be prohibited. Within the framework
of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions
on payments between Member States and between Mem-
ber States and third countries shall be prohibited.
9 Article 30 EC Treaty (ex Article 36):
The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods
in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public
policy or public security; the protection of health and life
of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological
value; or the protection of industrial and commercial
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, how-
ever, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
Article 28 EC Treaty (ex article 30) states that quantitative
restrictions on imports and all measures having equiva-
lent effect is prohibited between Member States.
Article 29 (ex article 34) states that quantitative restric-
tions on exports, and all measures having equivalent ef-
fect, is prohibited between Member States.
See also the decisions of the European Court of Justice;
Case C-8/74, Dassonville, 1974 ECR 837; Joined Cases C-
267/91 and C-268/91, Keck & Mithouard, 1993 ECR I-
6097.
10 Article 49 EC Treaty (ex article 59).
11 Cf. infra text accompanying notes 21–26.
12 See Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise
/ G. Schindler and J. Schindler, paragraphs 16–20, 1994
ECR I-1039, paragraphs 16–20.
13 Hereinafter referred to as the EC Court.
14 Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v.
G. Schindler & J. Schindler, 1994 ECR I-1039 [hereinafter
Schindler]; Case C-124/97, Markku Juhani Läärä, Cots-
wold Microsystems Ltd, Oy Transatlantic Software Ltd.
v. Kihlakunnansyyttäjä, Suomen Valtio, 1999 ECR I-6067
[hereinafter Läärä]; Case C-67/98, Questori di Verona v.
D. Zanatti, 1999 ECR I- 7289 [hereinafter Zanetti].
the underlying issues remain the same. There-
fore, the European Court of Justice reaffirmed
its Schindler15 rule in the Zenatti16 and Läära17
cases.
The court followed the principles laid down
in its Schindler ruling for several reasons.18
In the first place, while the concepts of “lot-
tery,” “casino game,” “sports bet,” etc. can
have a different meaning from one Member
State to another,19 European Law does not have
its own definition of “gaming activity.” A
“game” is deemed to be any activity involving
a certain amount of chance, a stake, and a prize
or economic value.20 If these three criteria are
present, the EC Court considers the activity to
be a “gaming activity.” In the second place, and
recognizing the diversity of the gaming concept
at Member State level, the EC Court made an
abstraction of that diversity by stating that
those activities had the same consequences.
Therefore, they should be submitted to the
same treatment. Finally, the underlying ques-
tions were the same: are Member states under
European Law allowed to restrict, or even pro-
hibit, the cross-border provision of gaming-re-
lated activities?
Consequently when assessing the compati-
bility between a restrictive Member State reg-
ulation and the free provision of services and
goods, the European Court had to answer five
questions.
Does the regulation concerned relate to an
economic activity?
The answer to this question is of paramount
importance. In principle, the EC Treaty will
only apply to economic activities. The Euro-
pean integration, however, embraces more
than economics.
If the answer to this question were a nega-
tive one, as some of the Member States advo-
cated, then the EC Court would not need to
look into the question whether national re-
strictions can be conciliated with the legal prin-
ciples of European Community Law.21
The EC Court, however, held that the Mem-
ber States did not bring forward cogent argu-
ments to narrow the scope of the EC Treaty. Be-
sides, it was evident from the facts of the cases,
as they were presented to the EC Court, that
the economic significance of gaming activities
was considerable in all the Member States. The
arguments that gaming activities are recre-
ational or playful activities, or that they are en-
trusted to public undertakings for public-in-
terest purposes,22 were not upheld by the EC
Court.
Furthermore, the Belgian and Luxembourg
government23 invoked Directive 75/368.24 By
means of transitional measures, this Directive
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15 Schindler, Case C-275/92.
16 Zenatti, Case C-67/98.
17 Läärä,, Case C-124/97.
18 See Läärä, paragraphs 15 and 21; Zanatti, paragraph 16
states: “even though the Schindler Judgment concerns the
organisation of lotteries, those considerations can also ap-
ply, as is clear also from the very paragraph 60 of that
judgement, to other comparable forms of gambling.”
19 In this regard, reference could be made to the concept
of “game” in Sweden and Belgium. In Sweden an activ-
ity is considered a lottery under the Lotteries Act of 9 June
1994, as modified, if it is gaming activity that does not fall
under the definition of casino game as established by the
Casino Act of 3 June 1999. In view of this open concept
of lottery, authorities do not encounter great difficulties
with the qualification of a game. See Lotteriinspektionen,
the Swedish Gaming Authority, http://www.lotteri-
insp.se.
The Belgian regime, on the contrary, is a legal patch-
work consisting of three different acts, each with its own
field of application and definitions, rendering the dis-
tinction between a casino game, lottery, or betting activ-
ity complex and rigid.
For an overview of French and Belgian gaming legis-
lation, see Thibault Verbiest, Internet gambling: The Euro-
pean legal framework, January 2, 2001, available at http://
www.droit-technologie.org.
Another example of such diversity can be found in the
United Kingdom’s gaming legislation, as described in de-
tail in the Gambling Review Report of 17 July 2001, also
known as the Budd Report [hereinafter the Budd Report].
20 See Läärä, at paragraphs 17–18.
21 See notably the Walrave Case, C-36/74, Walrave, 1974
ECR I-1405, and Donà v Mantero, Case C-13/76, Donà v
Mantero, 1976 ECR I-1333, decisions in which the court
held that certain sports activities were not of an economic
nature and therefore not covered by the EC Treaty.
22 Schindler, paragraph 35. In Schindler, Advocate General
Gulmann pointed out that the fact that the allocation of
profits for public interest purposes did not alter the eco-
nomic character of an activity. However, this argument is
significant when assessing whether the adoption of a re-
strictive measure is justified, cf. infra text accompanying
notes 39–44.
23 See Schindler, at paragraph 16.
24 Council Directive 75/368/EEC of 16 June 1975 on mea-
sures to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom of es-
tablishment and freedom to provide services in respect of
various services, Official Journal L 167, June 30, 1975, P.
0022–0028. This Directive is no longer in force.
favors the pursuit of specified activities by self-
employed persons. Although gaming activities
organized by public undertakings are excluded
from the scope of this Directive, it would be
rash to conclude that Community law as such
is not applicable to gaming activities.
Finally, the economic nature of gaming ac-
tivities was not altered because, as in most of
the Member States, gaming was considered un-
lawful.25 In this regard, the EC Court held that
even if the morality of gaming activities is ques-
tionable, it was not up to the court to pro-
nounce itself over more permissive Member
States regulations, where such activities can be
practiced legally.26
Does the economic activity relate to the free
provision of services or the free provision 
of goods?
The distinction between goods and services
is one that is not always easy to make. Through-
out its case-law, the EC Court has adopted the
accessorium sequitur principale principle, by virtue
of which the nature of an activity is determined
by the nature of the principal activity.27
In Schindler, the court held that sending ad-
vertisements and application forms had to be
considered as specific steps in the organization
of a lottery and could not as such be consid-
ered to be the final objective of that activity.
Furthermore, and although in both the
Schindler and Läärä cases goods28 were in-
volved, the EC Court ruled that the activities
at issue were those which provided for remu-
neration by an operator to enable persons to
participate in a game of chance with the hope
of winning. For that reason and by virtue of Ar-
ticle 50 of the EC Treaty, they had to be con-
sidered as services.29
In Läärä, the EC Court held that “in those cir-
cumstances, games consisting of the use, in re-
turn from money payment, of slot machines
such as those at issue in the main proceedings,
must be regarded as gambling, which is com-
parable to the lotteries forming the subject of
the Schindler judgment.”30
Contrary to Schindler, the Läärä slot machines
themselves are goods within the strict meaning
of Article 30 of the EC Treaty. Although this ar-
ticle could be applicable, the court concluded
that it did not have sufficient information re-
garding the effects of the adopted restrictive
measure.31 Therefore the EC Court ruled that
it was not able to answer the question whether
the national measure was incompatible with
Article 30 of the EC Treaty.
If there is a restriction in place, is it
discriminating?
By virtue of Article 49 of the EC Treaty,32
Member States may only impose and maintain
restrictions which do not discriminate on
grounds of nationality or residence.
This prohibition not only relates to a direct
or indirect discrimination against foreign ser-
vices provided on the national market, but can
also relate to the adoption of non-discrimina-
tory rules for foreign services.33 As such, in its
Saeger decision, the EC Court held that Article
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25 See Case C-294/82, Einberger v Hauptzollamt Freiburg,
1984 ECR I-1177 (EC Court’s decision regarding drugs).
26 See Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children Ireland v. Grogan, 1991 ECR I-4685, paragraph
20 (EC Court’s decision regarding abortion).
27 See Case C-326/88, GB-INNO, 1990 ECR I-667. This case
concerned advertisements for goods within the meaning
of Article 30 of the EC Treaty. See also the court’s Famil-
iapress decision regarding competitions published in mag-
azines in the form of crosswords and puzzles giving read-
ers the possibility to win something. Case C-368/95,
Verenigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags und –vertreibs
GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag, 1997 ECR I-3689.
28 Lottery tickets and slot machines.
29 Under Article 50 of the EC Treaty (ex article 60) these
activities must be considered as services, because they are
services that are normally provided for remuneration, in-
sofar as they are not governed by the provisions relating
to the freedom of movement of goods, capital, and per-
sons.
30 Läärä, at paragraph 18.
31 In Läärä the public Raha-automaattiyhdistys (RAY), the
Association for the Management of Slot Machines, was
granted an exclusive right to manufacture and sell slot
machines.
32 Article 49 EC Treaty (ex article 59) states:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, re-
strictions on freedom to provide services within the Com-
munity shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of
member States who are established in a State of the Com-
munity other than that of the person from whom the ser-
vices are intended.
33 See Case C-110/78, Ministère Public v. Van Wesemael,
1979 ECR I-35; Case C-279/80, Webb, 1981 ECR I-3305;
The “Tourist Guide cases”: Case C-154/89, Commission
v. France, Italy and Greece, 1991 ECR I-659, and Case C-
180/89, Commission v. Italy, 1989 ECR I-709.
49 of the EC Treaty not only precludes the
adoption of discriminatory provisions on the
ground of nationality, but also impedes the ac-
tivities of a service provider established in an-
other Member State where he is authorized to
provide that service.34
In all three cases, the court ruled that the reg-
ulations at issue were applicable without dis-
crimination on grounds of nationality.
In addition, Advocate General Gulmann
gave a broader interpretation of the concept of
“discrimination.”35
Gulmann also considered the fact that the
concerned restrictive measure, established by
the 1976 Lotteries and Amusement Act as
amended by 1993 National Lottery Act,36 only
related to nationwide lotteries and was not ap-
plicable to small scale lotteries. However, the
court held that the fact that the United King-
dom’s legislation37 in the field of gaming ac-
tivities differed from one gaming activity to an-
other was not discriminatory because, in the
first place, it requires a comparison between
economic operators in a non-comparable situ-
ation38 and, in the second place, such a com-
parison implies that attention should be paid
to the proper objectives, rules, and methods of
the operators involved.
Is the restriction justified?
Even if Member States have adopted non-
discriminating restrictive measures, these have
to be justified by the derogations, explicitly
provided for by the EC Treaty, and must be
necessary and proportioned to the pursued ob-
jective. This requirement is also known as the
rule of reason. In that respect, Member States
may, under Article 46 of the EC Treaty,39 enact
restrictive measures on grounds of public pol-
icy, public security, or public health.
These so-called socio-economic reasons are
threefold and out of principle have to be con-
sidered as a whole.40
In the first place, Member States can adopt
restrictions on gaming activities for what
could be called a responsible gaming policy,
i.e., to limit the exploitation of human passion
for gambling. Throughout history, various
forms of gaming and gambling have attracted
mankind. To curtail the negative, mostly social
and financial, consequences of excessive gam-
bling, and as such protect the homo ludens
against its own weakness, restrictions on both
the supply41 and demand sides are justified.42
In the second place, taking into consideration
the enormous amounts of money involved,
gaming activities can be associated with orga-
nized crime, e.g., money laundering or even tax
evasion. In addition and in connection with
consumer protection, it is conceivable that
criminal organizations mount up gaming ac-
tivities for fraudulent purposes.
Finally, and although the EC Court held that
it could not be considered as an independent
justification, the argument concerning the allo-
cation of profit from gaming activities to char-
ity or other public interest purposes is not with-
out relevance.
On various occasions, the court held that the
freedom to provide services throughout the Eu-
ropean Union may be overridden to safeguard
the well-being of consumers, in particular the
recipients of a service, and more generally to
guarantee order in society.43
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34 See Case C-76/90, Saeger v. Dennemeyer, 1991 ECR I-
4221, paragraph 12.
35 See Opinion of A.G. Gulmann, at paragraphs 68–76.
36 The 1976 Lotteries and Amusement Act, as modified,
grants the exclusive concession to organize national lot-
teries to an operator under public control, with allocation
of profits for public purpose reasons.
37 See the Budd report, supra note 19.
38 Under the 1976 Act all sorts of small scale lotteries, e.g.,
lotteries organized on behalf of certain societies or pro-
moted by local authorities, are allowed.
39 Article 46 EC Treaty (ex article 56):
The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pur-
suance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of pro-
visions laid down by law, regulation or administrative ac-
tion providing for special treatment for foreign nationals
on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health.
40 See Schindler, at paragraph 58. However, Advocate
General Gulmann could not preclude that these argu-
ments when considered separately, would not justify the
restriction imposed. See Schindler, opinion of A.G. Gul-
mann, at paragraph 92.
41 For example, granting exclusive licenses to certain qual-
ified operators or by prohibiting certain games.
42 For example, denying certain categories of persons, i.e.,
under-age persons, access to gaming facilities.
43 See Joined Cases C-110/78 and C-111/78, Ministère
public v. Van Wesemael & Follachio, 1979 ECR I-35, para-
graph 28 ; Case C-220/83 Commission v. France, 1986
ECR I-35, paragraph 20 ; and Case C-15/78, Société
Générale Alsacienne de Banque v. Koestler, 1978 ECR I-
1971, at paragraph 5.
In Schindler, where these arguments were de-
veloped for the first time in connection with
gaming services, the court concluded that in
the absence of any Community legislation, it
was up to each of the Member States to con-
sider what should be appropriate to protect
their internal social order.44
Is the restriction necessary and proportionate?
Following the jurisprudence of the EC Court,
it not only is necessary that obstacles to the free
provisions are justified by reasons of public
policy, but also that the adopted measure is re-
quired to guarantee the achievement of the in-
tended aim and is proportionate to that aim,
i.e., may not go further than necessary.45
In the Schindler case, Advocate General Gul-
mann could not have reflected better the para-
mount importance of this question in para-
graph 79 of his opinion:
The decisive questions are thus in my
view in any event whether the interest of
society invoked by the States are so fun-
damental that in the area in question they
can justify the existing restrictions and
whether the rules in question are objec-
tively necessary in order to achieve the ob-
jective pursued and are also reasonable in
relation to that objective.
Contrary to the opinions of the Advocates
General, the European Court of Justice upheld
in all three cases a similar answer to this ques-
tion.46 In the court’s opinion it is up to the Mem-
ber States individually to assess, based upon
their social model, what kind of measures
should be imposed to maintain order in society.
The mere fact that one Member State prohibits
certain gaming activities, while another Mem-
ber State advocates a less restrictive regime, for
example, by granting a limited number of li-
censes, does not necessarily imply that the more
restrictive measure is disproportionate in rela-
tion to the objective pursued or not necessary.
In Zanetti, however, the court stressed that it
could only allow such a restriction if the legal
disposition imposing the restriction de facto
corresponds to the stated objectives.47 There-
fore, when a Member State evokes the protec-
tion of consumers to justify a restrictive mea-
sure and no legal disposition concerning that
objective has been inserted in the legal instru-
ment imposing such a restriction, this could
mean that the restriction would not stand the
test of criticism.
While the jurisprudence of the court is con-
sistent on this point, it should be underlined
that the opinions of the Advocates General dif-
fer in each of the three cases.
In Schindler, A.G. Gulmann reasoned that, in
view of the unknown implications of an open
and competitive gaming sector, it was not pos-
sible to identify less restrictive measures for
achieving the pursued objectives.48
Advocate General Fennelly partially agreed
with A.G. Gulmann’s opinion, but added that
it was for the national court to consider
whether those two conditions were met.49
Contrary to the quoted opinions and deci-
sions, it was Advocate General La Pergola’s
opinion that the Finish law, granting the RAY
an exclusive right on gaming machines, did not
meet the criterion of proportionality. However
the EC Court saw it differently and did not fol-
low this opinion.
Preliminary conclusion
To summarize, it can be said that:
• The EC Treaty principally guarantees the
free provision of services, including gam-
ing services, in the European Union.
• The European Court of Justice has recog-
nized that, considering the proper nature
of cross-border gaming services, Member
States have wide discretional competences
to restrict the free provision thereof.
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44 See Schindler, at paragraph 61; Schindler, opinion of
A.G. Gulmann, at paragraphs 101–102.
45See Joined cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, Arblade, 1999
ECR I-8453, at paragraph 33; Case C-58/98, Corsten, 2000
ECR I-7919, at paragraph 33; Case C-361/98, Italy v. Com-
mission, 2001 ECR I-385, at paragraph 33; Case C-8/74,
Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 ECR 837; Case C-
288/89, Stichting Collective Antennevoorziening Gouda
v. the Netherlands, 1991 ECR I-4007, at paragraphs 13–15.
46 See Schindler, at paragraphs 61–62; Läärä, at para-
graphs 35–36; Zanetti, at paragraphs 33–34.
47 See Zanetti, at paragraph 36.
48 See Schindler, at paragraph 126.
49 See Zanetti, at paragraph 31–32
Nevertheless, opinions have been evolving
since then, driven by the dawning of the infor-
mation society.
In the first place, it should be emphasized that
the cases submitted to the EC Court’s jurisdic-
tion did not relate to e-gaming services. At 
this moment, the first case relating to an 
e-gaming service is pending before the EC
Court.50 When ruling on this case, the EC Court
will have to take into consideration the border-
less character of e-gaming services and the con-
cerned regulation of the information society.
Indeed, considering the consequences of
their borderless nature, national regulators will
be more frequently confronted with the cross-
border provision of goods and services. There-
fore, the future development of the information
society requires some cooperation between
and/or integration of the concerned sectors
and their regulation.51 While at the beginning
of the last decade of the 20th century, the Com-
mission, when declaring that it would not take
an initiative, made it clear that this would be
an option for the future.52
Therefore, and although no proper initiative
has been announced in this field, it is clear that
such an initiative can no longer be put aside.
In addition, with the development of the in-
formation society, some directives and pro-
grams have been adopted that have made an
indirect impact on the e-gaming sector.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS: THE RISE OF
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
As indicated before, when the European
Commission first addressed a European gam-
ing regulation, it concluded that there was no
need for EU wide regulation. It declared, how-
ever, that in the future, this was not to be ex-
cluded.53
This was reaffirmed by Commissioner Monti’s
response to a question raised by an EP member
J. Cushnahan, stating that the provision of 
e-gaming services throughout the European
Union would become a European issue.54
For that reason and in order to anticipate fu-
ture developments, one should consider the
European regulatory framework of the infor-
mation society.
The Internal Market Strategy for Services
In the first place, on December 29, 2000 the
European Commission published the Internal
Market Strategy for Services.55 The final ob-
jective of this initiative is to remove all re-
maining barriers to services in the Internal
Market. This will allow services to move across
national borders as easily as within a Member
State.
The Communication sets out a two-step ap-
proach to achieve this objective. Initially, the
Commission had to identify by the end of 2001
the existing barriers to the free movement of
services across national frontiers. In a second
phase, which had to come to an end by De-
cember 2002, the Commission was supposed to
bring forward a package of initiatives disman-
tling the identified barriers.
Although the roll-out of the Action Plan has
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50 Case C-243/01, Piergiorgio Gambelli. This case con-
cerns a local Italian operator, Piergiorgio Gambelli, who
made available the required material to connect gamblers
to the website of the UK based virtual bookmaker Euro-
bet. The lower court of Santa Maria Capua Vetere (Italy)
refused to condemn Gambelli for infringing the 1989 Act
concerning betting and gambling activities on sports com-
petitions (Act nr 401 of 13 December 1989) because the
activity was governed by UK law. Therefore the Italian
legal prohibition was not applicable. In addition, and go-
ing against the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice, the court held that the restriction of a UK autho-
rized activity was against the principles of the internal
market. In the appeal procedure, the Court of Ascoli Pi-
ceno (Italy) requested a preliminary ruling on the com-
patibility of Act nr 401 and Article 49 of the EC Treaty. A
ruling is expected by mid 2003.
Thibault Verbiest and Giovanni Maria Riccio, Jeux et lo-
teries sur Internet: un vent de libéralisation souffle en Europe,
November 28, 2000, available at http://www.droit-tech-
nologie.org.
51 See notably the 1998 Helsinki Declaration of the Gam-
ing Regulators European Forum, available at http://
www.gref.net.
52 See EU Institutions press releases, IP (92)1120, Decem-
ber 23, 1992.
53 Cf., EU Institutions press releases, IP (92) 1120, De-
cember 23, 1992. See also Coopers & Lybrand Europe,
Gambling in the Single Market—A Study of the Current
legal and Market Situation (1991).
54 See Written Question E-1190/98 of John Cushnahan,
April 29, 1998 and the answer given on July 13, 1998 on
behalf of the Commission.
55 Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament: An Internal Market Strat-
egy for Services, Brussels, December 29, 2000, COM(2000)
888 final.
been delayed,56 it is clear that, according to this
philosophy, Member States will have to open
their national borders to operators from other
Member States. Sooner or later, this general
movement should logically include cross-bor-
der gaming. But it will certainly not be accom-
plished without strong guarantees that Mem-
ber States may continue to exercise control over
the operations occurring on their soil.
Information Society Services
In the second place, one should consider the
proper nature of e-gaming activities.
Following the constant jurisprudence of the
EC Court, the provision of gaming activities
has to be considered a service.57
By virtue of Directive 1998/34/EC, as
amended by Directive 98/48/EC,58 e-games
can be considered services of the information
society, as they are: i) normally provided for
remuneration at a distance; ii) conducted by
electronic means; and iii) executed at the indi-
vidual request of a recipient of services, for in-
stance, the gambler.
Nevertheless, the Directive sets out a double
exclusion. On the one hand, two categories of
services are excluded from its scope of appli-
cation: first, services that do not respond to the
three aforementioned constitutive elements, for
example, the services enumerated in Annex V
of the Directive;59 and second, the service must
meet the definition set forth in Article 50 of the
EC Treaty. Services provided by a Member
State without any economic consideration in
the context of its duties—in particular in the so-
cial, cultural, educational and judicial fields—
are not covered by the definition given in Ar-
ticle 50 of the EC Treaty and therefore do not
fall within the scope of this Directive. As indi-
cated, the European Court of Justice has for-
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56 See Communication from the Commission to the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament final of the European
Commission of 30 July 2002, Report from the Commis-
sion to the Council and the European Parliament on the
State of the Internal Market for Services, presented under
the first stage of the Internal Market Strategy for Services,
Brussels, July 30, 2002, COM(2002) 441 final.
57 Cf., supra, text accompanying notes 21–26.
58 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 22 June 1998, establishing a procedure
for the provision of information in the field of technical
standards and regulations, Official Journal L 204, 21/07/
1998 P. 0037-0048 CONSLEG-98L0034-05/08/1998-33 P,
amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 20 July 1998, Official Journal
L 217, 05/08/1998 P. 0018-0026 CONSLEG-98L0034-05/
08/1998-33 P.
59 E.g., all point to multi-point broadcasting services such
as radio and television services, phone and fax services,
etc.
FIG. 1. E-gaming: The European regulatory perspective (by the author).
mally recognized gaming activities as ser-
vices.60
On the other hand, in addition to the ex-
cluded services, some regulations are excluded
from its scope of application, notably the reg-
ulation of telecommunication services, pro-
vided that these services are covered by Euro-
pean law, in particular by Directive 90/387/
CE.61
Once a service is qualified as an information
society service, each non-excluded regulatory
proposal must be communicated to the Com-
mission.62
This notification procedure was put in place
to safeguard the free provision of goods63 and
information society services.64 In this way, if a
Member State adopts a restrictive measure, the
Commission and the Member States can for-
mulate remarks, softening the restriction.
It is conceivable that Member States, where
online gaming organized by private companies
is authorized, will criticize proposals imposing
a restriction to the freedom to provide services
or vice versa.65
If a Member State does not notify the Com-
mission, or fails to do so in due time, the reg-
ulatory provision will be unenforceable pur-
suant to the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice.
Indeed, the EC Court held that the breach of
the obligation to notify constitutes a substan-
tial procedural defect such as to render the reg-
ulation in question inapplicable, and thus un-
enforceable against individuals.66
Contrary to the Swedish proposal for the
modification of the 1994 Lotteries Act,67 the
Belgian 2002 National Lottery Act68 was en-
acted by Parliament apparently without noti-
fying the Commission.69
Directive on electronic commerce
Finally, Article 3 of the Directive on elec-
tronic commerce of June 8, 200070 states:
Each Member State shall ensure that the
information society services provided by
a service provider established on its terri-
tory comply with the national provisions
applicable in the Member State in ques-
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60 Cf., supra text accompanying notes 27–31, and the ju-
risprudence of the European Court of Justice, Case C-
36/74, Walrave-Koch, o.c.; Case C-13/76, Donà v. Man-
tero, o.c.; Case C-15/78, Koestler, o.c.; Case C-352/85,
Bond van Adverteerders, o.c.
61See Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on
the establishment of the internal market for telecommu-
nications services through the implementation of open
network provision, Official Journal L 192, 24/07/1990 P.
0001-0009.
It should be underlined that in the field of telecommu-
nications the European Institutions are pursuing drastic
regulatory modifications. By mid 2003 the new regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and
services will be in place. This framework will consist of
five harmonization directives of the European Parliament
and Council, one liberalization Directive of the Commis-
sion and a decision of the European Parliament and Coun-
cil concerning a Community radio spectrum policy.
62 Article 8 of Directive 98/34/EC states that Member
States shall immediately communicate to the Commission
any draft technical regulation, except where it merely
transposes the full text of an international or European
standard, in which case information regarding the rele-
vant standard shall suffice; they shall also let the Com-
mission have a statement of the grounds which make the
enactment of such a technical regulation necessary, where
these have not already been made clear in the draft.
Where appropriate, and unless it has already been sent
with a prior communication, Member States shall simul-
taneously communicate the text of the basic legislative or
regulatory provisions principally and directly concerned,
should knowledge of such text be necessary to assess the
implications of the draft technical regulation.
Member States shall communicate the draft again un-
der the above conditions if they make changes to the draft
that have the effect of significantly altering its scope,
shortening the timetable originally envisaged for imple-
mentation, adding specifications or requirements, or mak-
ing the latter more restrictive.
63 See Directive 1998/34/EC.
64 See Directive 1998/48/EC.
65 See, e.g., the criticism of Denmark regarding the more
liberal UK legislation, The National Internet Gaming
Strategy of the Danish Ministry of Taxation of 18 June
2001.
66 See ECJ, Case C-194/94, CIA Security International
S.A.v. Signalson S.A., Jur. H.v..J, 1996 ECR I-2201; For the
application of this principle in a criminal procedure, see
ECJ, Case C-226/97, Johannes Martinus Lemmens, 1998
ECR I-3711.
67 The proposal concerns the regulation of lotteries ef-
fected by means of electromagnetic waves and became ef-
fective on August 1, 2002.
68 Act on the Rationalization of the Functioning and the
Management of the National Lottery, 19 April 2002, State
Monitor of 4 May 2002.
69 See Ewout Keuleers, Online Gaming nearly regulated in
Belgium? February 11, 2002, available at http://www.
droit-technologie.org.
70 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of
information society services, in particular electronic com-
merce, in the Internal Market, Official Journal L 178,
17/07/2000 P. 0001-0016.
tion which fall within the coordinated
field. 2. Member States may not, for rea-
sons falling within the coordinated field,
restrict the freedom to provide informa-
tion society services from another Mem-
ber State.
This essential provision is also referred to as
the internal market clause.
This Directive defines the place of establish-
ment as the place where an operator actually
pursues an economic activity through a fixed
establishment, irrespective of where websites
or servers are situated or where the operator
may have a mail box. This definition is in line
with the principles established by the EC
Treaty and the case-law of the European Court
of Justice. Such a definition is designed to re-
move current legal uncertainty and ensure that
operators cannot evade supervision, as they
will be subject to supervision in the Member
State where they are established.
By virtue of this principle, a virtual casino es-
tablished and regulated in Spain would be al-
lowed to offer its services to European citizens
without being subject to additional require-
ments or restrictions imposed by other Mem-
ber States.
Article 1 of the European E-commerce Di-
rective does, however, exclude games “which
involve wagering a stake with monetary value
in games of chance, including lotteries and bet-
ting transactions,” from the coordinated field.71
This does not necessarily mean that e-gaming
as such is not indirectly regulated by European
Law.
However, it can be advocated that in the fu-
ture the electronic commerce Directive will be
applied to or at least will have some kind of in-
fluence over the gaming sector.
In the first place, by July 2003, this Directive
must be reviewed and if necessary adapted to
legal, technical, and economic developments in
the field of information society services, in par-
ticular with respect to crime prevention, the
protection of minors, consumer protection, and
the proper functioning of the internal market.
In view of the aforementioned Internal Mar-
ket Strategy for Services and the possible evo-
lution within the gaming industry, it could be
imagined that this important economic sector
would fall within the coordinated field of the
E-commerce Directive.
In the second place and from a more philo-
sophical point of view, it should be under-
scored that the E-commerce Directive is and
will be the legislative foundation upon which
future relevant legislation will be enacted.72
This means that the principles laid down in the
Directive should be applicable to all aspects of
information society services, including gaming
services, or at least have an indicative function.
In the meantime, the German bet-at-home
case73 provides an eloquent example of the cur-
rent situation.
Due to restrictive German gambling legisla-
tion, a German company created an Austrian
subsidiary, www.bet-at-home.com GmbH, and
applied in Austria for an Austrian betting li-
cense. After obtaining the required license, the
Austrian subsidiary began offering its betting
services directly on the site www.bet-at-home.
com, and indirectly via www.bet-at-home.de.
On January 10, 2002 the Hanseatisches Ober-
landesgericht, the Hamburg High Court, re-
jected an appeal against the April 2001 decision
of the Hamburg Landesgericht prohibiting a
German company from inserting a link to an
Austrian online bookmaker, to publicize it, and
to divulge relevant information about its activ-
ities. The Court of Appeal held that under Ger-
man law providing gaming services is forbid-
den, except when properly authorized.
If the company bet-at-home.com GmbH pro-
vides German consumers the opportunity to
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71 Article 1 of Directive 2000/31/EC:
Objective and scope
This Directive seeks to contribute to the proper function-
ing of the internal market by ensuring the free movement
of information society services between the Member
States. . . . This Directive shall not apply to: . . . the fol-
lowing activities of information society services:
- gambling activities which involve wagering a stake with
monetary value in games of chance, including lotteries
and betting transactions;
72 See notably the Dutch Bill of 4 February 2002 concern-
ing e-casino games.
73 See Ewout Keuleers, Is linking to an online bookmaker il-
legal? July 1, 2002, available at http://www.droit-tech-
nologie.org.
place wagers, then that company is undertak-
ing gaming activities on German soil, for which
a German license is required. The mere fact that
the server is located outside of Germany is of
no importance. What is relevant is that the Ger-
man market is targeted.
Because no German license was issued, the
Austrian company was infringing the German
Criminal Code and the German parent com-
pany was forbidden to maintain or insert links
to the Austrian company, to advertise it, or to
provide information about it.
Another example of national case law in this
field is the so-called Millions2000 case.74 In this
case, similar to Schindler, the Lichtenstein based
and authorized International Lottery sought ju-
dicial review of the 1976 Lotteries and Amuse-
ment Act prohibiting the promotion of nation-
wide lotteries. It was argued that the UK
publicity ban was contrary to the free move-
ment of services as provided for by Articles 49
of the EC Treaty and 36 of the EEA-Treaty.75
Mr. Justice Moses of the London High Court of
Justice dismissed the action, determining that
under the 1994 Schindler decision of the EC
Court such a restriction was justifiable for rea-
sons of social policy and the prevention of
fraud.
Towards a European regulatory framework 
for e-gaming?
When Advocate General Gulmann76 as-
sessed the application of the principle of equiva-
lence on gaming services, he could not know
that similar principles would be inscribed in
the E-commerce Directive.77
Advocate General Gulmann reasoned: “By
virtue of the principle of equivalence, the
Member State of destination may not impose
additional restrictions to the cross-border pro-
vision of services if those services are already
subject to the adequate rules of the home
state.”78
Although he considered that this principle
was difficult to apply on the facts of the
Schindler case, its application should prevail
over the raised objections.79
However, recognizing the necessity to limit
the overall supply of gaming services and in
the absence of any Community rules in this
field, restrictive measures necessarily had to be
implemented separately by each Member State.
Therefore A.G. Gulmann concluded that if in-
dividual Member States must allow the cross-
border provision of gaming services, held in a
lawful and proper manner in another Member
State, they are denied the opportunity to con-
trol the overall supply.
A contrario, this would mean that if European
rules in the field of gaming activities were
adopted, the arguments evoked by Member
States to justify the application of restrictive
measures, notably the protection of society at
large, would lose their relevance.
Considering the borderless nature of e-gam-
ing services and the need to regulate the infor-
mation society from a higher level than the one
of the Member States, the adoption of a Euro-
pean regulatory framework for e-gaming ser-
vices seems to be appropriate. This Commu-
nity framework would not only establish the
ground principles for the cross-border provi-
sion of e-gaming services and harmonize con-
sumer protection in the field of gaming legis-
lation, but would also give Member States a
certain degree of flexibility to adopt tailored
national measures in compliance with the Eu-
ropean framework.
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74 See London High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Di-
vision, 14 June 1999, R v. The Secretary of State for the
Home Department ex parte The International Lottery in
Liechtenstein Foundation and the Electronic Fundraising
Company plc.
75 Lichtenstein is a member of the European Economic
Area.
76 See Schindler, at paragraphs 93–104.
77 Regarding the internal market clause and the principle
of mutual recognition, cf., supra text accompanying notes
55–56.
78 See Case C-205/84, Commission / Germany, 1986 ECR
3755.
79 This for three reasons. First, the United Kingdom’s pro-
tection of consumers would be of the same level, irre-
spective of the characteristics of the game, i.e. small scale
lottery, football pool, or national lottery. Second, the pro-
tection offered by German law in relation to the Sued-
deutsche Klassenlotterie, is of a high degree. Therefore, it
cannot be said that there is a greater risk of abuse in con-
nection with that lottery than for other forms of gaming.
Finally, if such a risk exists, it does not justify the appli-
cation of the restrictions imposed by the laws of the coun-
try of destination.
WHAT WILL THE FUTURE BRING?
Nobody can predict the future. However, all
things considered, it is possible that Europe is
at the advent of an e-gaming breakthrough.
First, although the EC Court has recognized
the wide discretionary power of Member States
to adopt and enforce restrictive gaming mea-
sures, it should be emphasized that the rele-
vant jurisprudence only relates to offline forms
of gaming and not to all sorts of e-gaming, i.e.,
an information society service.
Second, considering the proper nature of e-
gaming services, i.e., the borderless character of
the information society, national authorities
will have to recognize that a restrictive national
regulation would remain dead letter if a citizen
can log onto a foreign gaming platform with
the same convenience as he does a national one.
In this regard Member States have to realize
that e-gaming is a unique activity and therefore
should benefit from a proper, adequate, and
technology-neutral regulatory framework. In
the end, the adoption of such a framework is in
the best interest of all parties involved. By giv-
ing operators an opportunity to operate their
services from within their national jurisdiction,
they are not forced to establish their servers in
remote or exotic overseas places. By doing so,
governments can continue to impose taxes on
these activities and relocate the profits thereof.
In addition, operators will be able to operate in
broad daylight, this in strict compliance with
the relevant regulations. Finally, the gambler
and even the society at large will benefit from
this regulation. Gamblers no longer need to surf
to www.casino.ag to play, but can rely on the
fact that when they enter www.casino.it or
www.casino.dk, their rights, e.g., privacy and
interests, are adequately protected.
Finally, new technologies are fundamentally
changing our society. This progress will need
to be accompanied by an adequate and open
regulatory framework. More and more, the EC
Court will have to rule upon pending and fu-
ture gaming cases taking this framework into
consideration.
For these three reasons the adoption of a Eu-
ropean regulatory framework in the field of e-
gaming activities can be advocated.
When ruling upon the Gambelli case, the first
European e-gaming case, the EC Court will be
confronted with these new dilemmas and par-
adigms. Therefore, and in light of the forego-
ing, it is conceivable that the EC Court will de-
viate from its classical jurisprudence in this
field and recognize what is already a reality: a
cross-border e-gaming market.
It is probably to soon to cheer, but let the
games begin.
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